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Caveat caveat caveat emptor? 
 
 
Section 129 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) provides, in part, that a caveator may 
only lodge another caveat on the same, or substantially the same, grounds with the 
leave of a court of competent jurisdiction.  Justice Williams considered the operation 
of s129 in Ferguson v Mackee1.  Although the facts are somewhat convoluted they are 
critical to an understanding of the decision. 
 
Facts 
 
A contract for the purchase of a lot in a town house complex was signed by Mackee 
(the “original purchaser”).  A dispute arose as to whether the town house was 
constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications in the contract.  The 
vendor ultimately purported to terminate the contract for default by the original 
purchaser and entered into a further contract with the Fergusons (the “new 
purchaser”).  Settlement of the sale to the new purchaser was duly effected.  The 
following day (20 January 1999) the original purchaser became aware that settlement 
had occurred and lodged a caveat (the “first caveat”) on the grounds of being a 
purchaser of the estate in fee simple. 
 
In the absence of a notice served pursuant to s126 (2) of the Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld), the caveat lodged on 20 January 1999 would lapse after 3 months unless within 
that time proceedings were commenced to establish the interest claimed under the 
caveat and the Registrar was notified both of the commencement and identity of the 
proceedings.  In this instance the original purchaser did commence proceedings 
claiming specific performance of the original contract within the statutory 3-month 
period but unfortunately the required notice was not given to the Registrar of Titles.  
As a result, the first caveat lapsed. 
 
On 16 April 1999 another caveat (the “second caveat”) was lodged on behalf of the 
original purchaser.  Both the interest claimed and the grounds of the claim specified in 
the second caveat were the same as the first caveat.  Not surprisingly, the Registrar 
issued a requisition calling attention to s129 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). 
 
Following the issue of the requisition, the second caveat was then amended to include 
fresh grounds of claim.  The new grounds of claim alleged that the caveator had a lien 
for the recovery of damages, deposit and other monies following what was alleged to 
be the unlawful termination of the first contract.  The amendment of the caveat led to 
the issue of a further requisition by the Registrar who suggested that as the grounds of 
claim had been substantially changed, the caveat should be fully withdrawn and a new 
caveat lodged. 
 
The Registrar of Titles ultimately rejected the second caveat on the basis that the 
requisition had not been complied with. 
 
Undeterred, the solicitor for the original purchaser lodged a third caveat, the grounds 
of claim being identical to those contained in the second caveat, as amended, namely 
on the basis of an alleged lien.  The new purchaser sought an order from Justice 
Williams that the third caveat be removed, thereby removing the impediment to 
registration of their transfer. 
 
Decision 
 
The central issue for determination was whether the Registrar had rejected the second 
caveat in its original form or, alternatively, whether the caveat had been rejected in its 
amended form claiming, inter alia, a lien over the land to secure repayment of the 
deposit paid.  Not without some hesitation, Williams J concluded that the second 
caveat had been rejected in its amended form.  Following from this conclusion, in 
accordance with s129 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), the original purchaser 
required the leave of the court before lodging the third caveat on the same grounds.  
As the court’s leave had not been obtained it was ordered that the third caveat be 
removed. 
 
Justice Williams opined that removal of the caveat was also justified on other 
grounds.  Although a purchaser’s lien for deposit monies paid by the caveator 
pursuant to a contract of sale has been recognised 2 Justice Williams was of the view 
that no lien would be acquired where the deposit was paid to, and still held by, a 
stakeholder (in this instance the real estate agent).3 
 
Practice Pointers 
 
The decision of Justice Williams in Ferguson v Mackee 4 serves to highlights a 
number of issues for practitioners who may lodge caveats on behalf of their clients. 
 
In accordance with s126 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) merely commencing 
proceeding to establish the interest claimed under the caveat is not sufficient to 
prevent the lapse of a caveat.  The Registrar must be notified both of the 
commencement and identity of the proceedings within the specified statutory period. 
 
The court’s leave is not required if a further caveat is not being lodged on the same, or 
substantially the same, grounds.  However, in these circumstances, as a matter of 
practice, the original caveat should always be withdrawn and a new caveat lodged. 
 
Before lodging any caveat, and particularly a further caveat, the validity of the 
grounds of the claim must be carefully considered.  As this decision illustrates, if a 
purchaser claims a lien for return of deposit money the identity of the party holding 
the deposit may be critical and it will always be necessary to consider if the contract 
of sale has been terminated without fault on the part of the purchaser. 
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